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EDITOR’S NOTE 
 Professor Reinhard Zimmermann is 
currently the Director of the Max 
Planck Institute for Comparative and 
International Private Law in Hamburg, 
Germany. In 2010 he received an Hon-
orary Doctorate of Law from McGill 
University, and the following text is 
transcribed from his speech to the 
graduating class. Professor Zimmermann 
is a leading expert in both the common 
law and civil law traditions, and has 
taught at many of the world’s finest law 
schools throughout his career. His posi-
tion as one of the world’s leading figures 
in comparative law gives his words 
much weight, and this speech repre-
sents the spirit that has evolved within 
the McGill Law Journal, especially 
since the inception of the McGill Law 
transsystemic program a decade ago.  
MOT DE LA RÉDACTRICE 
Le professeur Reinhard Zimmermann 
est actuellement directeur du Max 
Planck Institute for Comparative and 
International Private Law à Ham-
bourg, en Allemagne. En 2010, il a re-
çu un doctorat honorifique en droit de 
l’Université McGill. Ce texte est la 
transcription du discours qu’il a pronon-
cé devant la cohorte de finissants. Le 
professeur Zimmermann est un expert 
éminent de la common law et du droit 
civil. Tout au long de sa carrière, il a 
enseigné dans de nombreuses écoles de 
droit qui figurent parmi les meilleures 
au monde. Sa notoriété mondiale en 
tant qu’expert du droit comparé donne 
un gage de crédibilité à ses paroles. Ce 
discours représente l’esprit qui a évolué 
au sein de la Revue de droit de McGill, 
et ce, surtout depuis la création, il y une 
décennie, du programme transsystémique 
au sein de la Faculté de droit. 
 




 Chancellor Arnold Steinberg, Principal Heather Munroe Blum, Chair 
of the Board Kip Cobbett, Dean Daniel Jutras, Mr. Justice Nicholas 
Kasirer, distinguished faculty members, parents, friends, and most of all 
fellow graduates. 
 The theme of my graduation address is legal history and comparative 
law. Let me very briefly confront you with three characteristic texts and 
their impact. 
 Some grain merchants sail from Alexandria to the famine-stricken 
island of Rhodes, where grain has become a very precious commodity. 
May the merchant whose vessel arrives first sell his grain to the starving 
Rhodians without indicating that various other vessels are about to arrive 
with the result that the price of grain will drop dramatically? Or is he 
under a duty of disclosure? This is a problem raised by Marcus Tullius 
Cicero in his work De officiis and it has been discussed, over the centuries, 
by generations of lawyers. Today it is as relevant as it was in Roman 
times, in France or Germany as much as in England or Canada. 
Situations where we have an asymmetrical distribution of information 
occur particularly frequently in business-to-consumer relations. And 
European Union legislation has thus established a comprehensive system 
of duties to inform in order to redress that imbalance. The extent of such 
duties, and whether they also exist in business-to-business relations 
remains subject to considerable dispute. 
 Passons au deuxième texte. Une personne dépose une épée chez un 
ami. Quand elle revient trouver son ami après quelques semaines, elle est 
devenue folle. Ce cas a été discuté, lui aussi, par Cicero. Selon Cicero, 
l’ami n’est pas obligé de rendre l’épée. C’est un texte étudié avec la même 
intensité à travers les siècles que mon premier exemple. Le texte de 
Cicero constitue l’un des points de départ de la doctrine de la clausula 
rebus sic stantibus. Celle-ci prévoit que tout contrat conclu est sujet à une 
condition tacite selon laquelle les circonstances fondamentales, à base 
desquelles le contrat a été conclu, n’auront pas changé. Cette doctrine a 
été renforcée par St. Thomas d’Aquin d’un point de vue de la philosophie 
morale. En effet, St. Thomas d’Aquin ne considérait pas comme pêcher 
l’inexécution d’un contrat lorsque les circonstances avaient changé. Les 
rédacteurs du code civil allemand avaient rejeté la doctrine de la clausula 
rebus sic stantibus. Tout de même, ce concept a trouvé sa place dans le 
droit allemand grâce à la jurisprudence et basé sur le concept général de 
la bonne foi. Les systèmes plus modernes comme les Principles of 
European Contract Law proposent des versions intitulées « change of 
circumstances ». 
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 The next case is from a fifteenth century treatise from Naples. A 
husband secretly enters the room where his dying wife is engaged in 
making her will. He bends his face over hers and entreats and flatters her 
into making a legacy of immovable property to him. This legacy was 
subsequently held to be invalid, and the Neapolitan jurists, in this 
context, resorted to the notion of metus reverentialis, reverential fear, 
which had been established in medieval law on the basis of individual 
points of departure from the Roman sources. In English law, the doctrine 
of undue influence was developed to cope with this type of situation. In 
continental legal systems, however, metus reverentialis was forgotten. 
Courts and legal writers in Germany were thus confronted with a 
difficulty when they had to deal with cases where a husband persuades 
his wife to act as surety for his debts vis-à-vis a bank. A decision by the 
Federal Constitutional Court was required to induce the Federal Supreme 
Court to invalidate contracts of suretyship far exceeding the means of the 
surety, and concluded under the influence of an emotional attachment. 
Effectively, therefore, the courts have reintroduced the notion of undue 
influence, or metus reverentialis, into German law under cover of the boni 
mores provision contained in the Code. 
 What do these three case studies have to tell us? They all lie at the 
intersection of legal history, comparative law, and modern legal doctrine; 
that is, of what are usually taken to be three distinct disciplines within 
the field of legal scholarship. 
 Today, particularly in codified legal systems, we are used to regarding 
our private laws as comprehensive and closed systems of legal rules 
constituting an autonomous interpretational space. Thus, in Germany as 
much as in France or Spain, the intellectual horizon of lawyers was 
limited by the rules and principles contained in the respective codes. This 
is an ideology that has also shaped the research programme of legal 
history, for scholarship in legal history has thoroughly historicized itself. 
It aims to discover the past purely for its own sake. 
 Ever since I studied law at the University of Hamburg I have found 
this separation of legal history, comparative law, and doctrinal 
scholarship unsatisfactory; and one of the central aims of my work is to 
overcome what I regard as an unfortunate narrowing of the perspective. A 
study merely of the modern legal systems as we find them today will 
reveal a long list of commonalities and differences. If one wants to know 
how these differences and commonalities can be explained, one has to 
adopt, in addition, a historical approach. There may be cultural, social, or 
economic differences; there may be historical accidents and 
misunderstanding; lawyers may have latched on to different layers, or 
sources, within one and the same tradition; and so on. It is this kind of 
comprehension that paves the way for rational criticism and organic 
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development of the law. The past, of course, does not justify itself; nor 
does it necessarily contain the solutions for present day problems. But the 
law constitutes a tradition, and an appreciation of that fact is the first and 
essential prerequisite for devising appropriate solutions for the present 
day. Duties to disclose and dealing in good faith, change of circumstances, 
and the effect of undue influence on wills and contracts: these are all 
issues that every modern legal system in the Western world has to 
grapple with. We can all learn from each other but we can do this so much 
better when we understand how we got where we are now; how, in other 
words, the tapestry of our modern legal systems has been created.   
 At the McGill Faculty of Law you have decided to pull down the walls 
that still prevent lawyers in Europe from considering themselves 
European lawyers. I think we can learn very much from this encouraging 
experience of a legal education that is not essentially tied to the sources of 
one legal system only. It widens the perspective horizontally and, at the 
same time, provides an ideal opportunity for extending it also vertically: 
to look at the common law and the civil law as two traditions and, partly 
at least, as two modern manifestations of one and the same, a Western 
legal tradition. It is, therefore, a great honour and pleasure for me to 
accept an honourary degree from a law faculty with whose approach I feel 
so much in harmony. I am profoundly grateful to become an alumnus of 
this centre of excellence and I thank you very much, Dean Jutras, for your 
exceedingly kind and generous words of introduction. Finally I wish you, 
the graduates of this law faculty, well in whatever professional career you 
decide to pursue and wherever you decide to pursue it. You are 
particularly well equipped to face the challenges of a world whose laws 
are no longer kept in neatly isolated national boxes. 
    
